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FROM RIO TO KYOTO: A STUDY OF 
THE INVOLVE:MENT OF NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN 
THE NEGOTIATIONS ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
CHIARA GIORGETII* 
lNTR.ODUCITON 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have acquired an 
increasingly relevant status in the international policy arena. 
This prominence can be seen in the expanded role of NGOs in 
preparing and executing development projects,1 and in negotiat-
ing international legal agreements. NGOs also command influ-
ence at most levels of the international legal system, participate 
in the implementation and monitoring of international conven-
tions, and serve as experts 'in governmental delegations.2 
This Article analyzes the influence of non-governmental ac-
tors on the negotiations of the Framework Convention on Cli-
* Program Officer, United Nations Development Programme (Somalia). 
The author wishes to thank Robin Aram and Frits Hermans from Shell Interna-
tional in London, and Professor Richard B. Stewart from New York University 
for their support and comments. The author would also like to thank Mark 
Tamoshunas, Articles Editor at the N.Y. U. Environmental La111 Journal, for his 
assistance. Portions of this piece, particularly Part ill, build upon an earlier 
article published in the Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law. 
See Chiara Giorgetti, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in tile Cli-
mate Change Negotiations, 9 CoLO. J. !NT'L ENVn.. L. & PoL'Y 115 (1998}. 
1 About 41 o/o of the projects approved by the World Bank in Fiscal Year 
1995 (FY 95) included provisions on NGOs (between 1973 and 1988 the aver-
age was six percent), and the Bank is committed to increasing communication 
and cooperation with NGOs. Priorities include consultation on policy issues 
and improvement in document dissemination, as well as new findings to 
strengthen NGO sectors in borrowing countries. See WoRLD BANK, NGOs 
AND THE BANK: INcoRPoRATING FY95 PROGRESS REPoRT ON CooPERATION 
BETWEEN THE WoRLD BANK AND NGOs at i (1996). 
z For example, in the discussion of the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, the presence of human rights NGOs has been constant and 
valued. See Steve Chamovitz, Tlvo Centuries of Participation: NGOs and Inter-
national Governance, 18 MICH. J.lNT'L L. 183,266 (1997). 
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mate Change (FCCC or the Convention).3 In particular, it 
evaluates the methods employed by NGOs in furthering their 
substantive agendas, the interaction among various non-govern-
mental actors, and the results of their efforts. 
This Article considers two kinds of NGOs: business and en-
vironmental. Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) are the self-de-
fined representatives of environmental interests. They campaign 
for the strict reduction of all gases that induce climate change. 
On the other side, business NGOs (BNGOs) typically represent 
the interests of those industries that are involved in the industrial 
cycles that damage the atmosphere. The analysis of the different 
approaches and actions of these groups during the negotiations is 
particularly interesting and relevant.· Given the conflicting mis-
sions of these two groups, one might believe that ENGOs and 
BNGOs operate without regard to one another. In reality, busi-
ness and environmental NGOs are not always completely sepa-
rate entities. As this Article demonstrates, ENGOs and BNGOs 
extensively scrutinize one another and frequently engage in offi-
cial negotiations and discussions on various policy options. 
I 
THE REsPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
The issue of climate change is a relatively recent develop-
ment in the long history of international environmental negotia-
tions. Between the 1950s and 1980s, awareness of the threats and 
dangers of climate change began to emerge in the scientific com-
munity. It was only in the latter half of the 1980s, however, that 
public and political interest in the dangers of climate change 
arose.4 In the 1990s, the threat of climate change became one of 
the most discussed global environmental concerns.s 
3 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter 
FCCC]. 
4 See Daniel Bodansky, Prologue to the Climate Change Convention, in NE· 
GOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE 45, 45-46 (Irving M. Mintzer & J. Amber Leo-
nard eds., 1994). 
s Climate change is the consequence of increased concentration of carbon 
dioxide (C02) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere. In addi-
tion to C02, the most important GHGs are methane (Nlit), clorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs), ozone (03), hydrofiuorocarbons (HFCs), perfiuorocarbons (PFCs), and 
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). GHGs trap the sun's heat and keep it from escap-
ing beyond the atmosphere of the Earth. C02 and other carbon-based sub-
Ima ed with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 
1999] NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE 203 
In 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), a group of approximately 1000 scientists working under 
the aegis of the United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO), concluded 
in their Second Assessment Report (SAR)6 that "the balance of 
evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global cli-
mate."7 The SAR also concluded that in the last century the 
mean temperature of the Earth rose by between 0.3 and 0.6 de-
grees Celsius and that the global sea level rose between ten and 
twenty centimeters.8 For the end of the twenty-first century, the 
SAR forecasted a sea level rise of between fifteen and ninety-five 
centimeters and an average temperature increase of two degrees 
Celsius.9 
The Second Assessment Report also addressed the conse-
quences of climate change. The report concluded that the pro-
jected increase in mean temperatures would have a significant 
impact on physical and ecological systems, human health, and 
socio-economic sectors. It projected that the change in tempera-
ture will occur at such a rapid rate that many ecosystems may not 
stances are continuously exchanged between the atmosphere, the oceans, and 
the biosphere. Carbon is crucial in the living environment, and it is fundamen-
tal for the vital cycle of animals, plants, and soil. Within this natural cycle, ex-
changes of C02 are many times greater than anthropogenic emissions of C<>t. 
Yet, these natural exchanges are almost completely balanced. However, since 
the beginning of this century and the onset of the industrial revolution, CO: 
levels have been rising at the rate of four percent per decade. Many scientists 
think that this increase is largely due to human activities, as it coincides with the 
beginning of consistent and considerable C02 emissions from human-controlled 
sources. Six-to-eight billion tons of carbon are produced annually by human 
activities and deforestation. However, only about 3.4 billion additional tons 
accumulate in the atmosphere each year. Scientists believe that the other three-
to-four billion tons of carbon ("the missing carbon") are absorbed by the 
oceans and land biosphere. Scientists need to address both the issue of the 
missing carbon and the role of the oceans, together with a more thorough un-
derstanding of climatic patterns. See generally DA vm D. KEMP, GLOBAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL IssUES 144-45 (2d ed. 1994); R. KERRY TURNER ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL EcoNol\ncs 268 (1993). 
6 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Second Assessment Re-
port (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.usgcrp.gov/ipcclhtmUSARwgii.html> 
[hereinafter SAR]. 
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Srmrmary for Po/icymakers: 
The Science of Climate Change-IPCC Working Group I § 4 (visited Feb. 16, 
1999) <http://www.ipcc.ch/cc95/wgl.htm>. 
s See id. § 3. 
9 Seeid. § 5. 
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have time to adapt.10 Rising temperatures will also lead to a rise 
in mortality and illness due to the increased number and intensity 
of heat waves and the increased potential for the transmission of 
tropical diseases.n 
To control the consequences of climate change, the climate 
system requires the adoption of long-term solutions. Many be-
lieve that, in conformity with the precautionary principle,12 ac-
tions should be taken to prevent the hazardous effects of climate 
10 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policy-
makers: Scientific-Technical Analyses of Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of 
Climate Change-IPCC Working Group II § 4 (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http:// 
www.ipcc.ch/cc95/wg2.htm>. Because of temperature increases, forests would 
need to migrate to find a climate with characteristics that are simila.r to the ones 
that are necessary for their survival, but forests can only migrate at a range of 
about 4 to 200 kilometers per century. See id. The 1 to 3.5 degree Celsius 
projected temperature increase would require forests to move 150 to 550 kilo-
meters per century, which is well beyond their capacity. See id. Changes in 
temperature will also bring negative consequences to other ecosystems. 
Deserts are likely to become hotter but not wetter, and up to one half of ex-
isting mountain glacier mass could disappear. See id. Consequences to coastal 
systems could include: erosion of shores and associated habitat, increased salin-
ity of estuaries, altered tidal ranges in rivers and bays, and increased coastal 
flooding. See id. The temperatures of oceans will increase, and this could alter 
ocean circulation and reduce sea-ice cover. See id. Climate change will also 
have an impact on regional freshwater resources and fisheries. Agriculture pro-
ductivity will increase in some areas and decrease in others, like the tropics and 
subtropics, even though global production probably could be maintained. Fi-
nally, climate change will affect human activities and settlements. Since a large 
part of the population lives in coastal regions, a sea level increase of SO centime-
ters would put 92 million people at risk of flooding due to storm surges; a one-
meter sea level rise would affect 118 million people. See id. Land loss will be 
another consequence of sea level rise, with estimates ranging from 0.05% for 
Uruguay, 1% for Egypt, and 17.5% for Bangladesh to about 80% for the Mar· 
shall Islands. See id. 
11 See id. 
12 The precautionary principle is a principle of international law that implies 
that states can decide to take action to protect the environment and prevent 
environmental hazards despite the lack of full scientific certainty. Such actions 
and measures would have a preventive and precautionary effect that would pre-
vent serious or irreversible damage. The precautionary principle is founded on 
the degree of scientific certainty necessary for action to be taken by the interna-
tional community. See 1 PHILLIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES oF INTERNATIONAL EN· 
VIRONMENTAL LAw 208-13 (1995). Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states 
that "[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation." United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development: The Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, June 13, 1992, princ. 15, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 [hereinafter Rio 
Declaration]. 
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change. Preventive measures should not be postponed because 
there is a lack of full scientific evidenceP 
II 
THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
Two international conventions were opened for signature at 
the second United Nations Conference on Environment and De-
velopment (UNCED) held in Rio in 1992: the FCCCI4 and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.15 UNCED was a fundamen-
. tal step toward tlie recognition of environmental concerns in na-
tional and international political arenas, and significantly 
increased public concern and awareness of environmental issues. 
UNCED represented the final phase of long and successful dip-
lomatic negotiations on environmental issues. In Rio, the inter-
national community agreed on several important legal measures 
to protect the environment, including the Rio Declaration (a 
general statement of principles that takes into account the rights 
and obligations of countries to the global environment),t6 
Agenda 21 (an action plan for sustainable development),l' and a 
Statement of Principles on Forests.18 
At UNCED, nearly 1500 NGOs were accredited to attend 
formal and some informal meetings. This gave NGOs the oppor-
tunity to lobby governmental representatives, present docu-
ments, and meet and form coalitions among themselves.19 
Agenda 21 underlined the importance of the involvement of non-
governmental organizations during UNCED. For example, it 
states that "[r]elevant non-governmental organizations ... 
13 See SANDs, supra note 12, at 208-13. 
14 FCCC, supra note 3. 
15 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818. 
16 Rio Declaration, supra note 12. 
17 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
mel!t, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex ll, Agenda Item 21, at 12, U.N. Doc. AI 
CONF.151/26 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda Item 21]. 
18 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: State-
ment of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation 
and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, June 13, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 
881 [hereinafter UNCED]. 
19 See Ann Doherty, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in UN-
CED, in NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 199, 203·07 (Bertram 
Spector et al. eds., 1994) (explaining the role of NGOs and reporting how 
NGOs judged the entire process). 
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should be given opportunities to make their contributions and 
establish ~ppropriate relationships with the United Nations sysM 
tem."20 The U.N. system, with consultation from NGOs, should 
take measures to design a system of effective NGO participation, 
take into account the findings of review systems and evaluation 
processes of NGOs, and establish procedures for an expanded 
role of NGOs in the implementation of Agenda 21.21 
The adoption of the FCCC was the first step taken by the 
international community to address the issue of global climate 
change. The objective of the FCCC is to stabilize "greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would preM 
vent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate sysM 
tem."22 As a minimum, the FCCC provides that all countries 
should report a national inventory of "anthropogenic emissions 
by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol."23 There are further comM 
mitments for a party, depending upon the annex into which it is 
classified.24 An Annex I nation must take "measures on the mitiM 
gation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions 
of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse 
gas sinks and reservoirs" with the goal of returning "by the end 
of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emisM 
sions" of greenhouse gases (GHGs).25 In addition, Annex II parM 
ties are to "take all practical steps to promote, facilitate and 
finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmenM 
tally sound technologies and know-how to other parties, particuM 
larly developing country parties, to enable them to implement 
20 Agenda Item 21, supra note 17, para. 38.42, at 467. 
21 See id. para. 38.43, at 467. 
22 FCCC, supra note 3, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 854. 
23 /d. art. 4.1(a), 31 I.L.M. at 855; see also Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.16, 1987,26 I.L.M.1550 (entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol] (regulating the emissions of 
CFCs). 
24 Annex I (all countries listed) and Annex II(* only) Parties are the follow-
ing: Australia*, Austria*, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada*, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark*, European Community*, Estonia, Finland*, France*, Germany*, 
Greece*, Hungary, Iceland*, Ireland*, Italy*, Japan*, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux· 
embourg*, the Netherlands*, Poland, Portugal*, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland*, Thrkey, the United Kingdom*, and the United 
States*. Note that both the European Union and all its members are Parties of 
the Convention. See FCCC, supra note 3, Annex I-II, 31 I.L.M. at 872-73. 
25 /d. art. 4.2(a), 31 I.L.M. at 856. 
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the provisions of the Convention."26 Annex IT parties should 
also assist developing countries, parties that are particularly vul-
nerable to climate change, in "meeting costs of adaptation.''27 
Further, these parties should provide "new and additional finan-
cial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by develop-
ing country Parties" in complying \vith the obligation of 
providing national inventories.28 Fmally, the FCCC introduces a 
controversial policy measure, Joint Implementation (ll), that 
would allow parties to the Convention to reduce GHG emissions 
by financing or investing in reduction processes, such as cleaner 
technologies, in another party.29 
A. COPl: Berlin, March 1995 
The first Conference of the Parties after Rio (COPl) was 
held in Berlin in 1995 (one year after the Convention took effect) 
as prescribed by FCCC Article 7.4.30 
During COPl, there were two important developments. The 
first was the establishment of the Berlin Mandate3t to negotiate 
commitments on emissions after the year 2000. The Berlin Man-
date recognizes that the commitments of the FCCC are not ade-
quate and calls for the beginning of a process to strengthen the 
commitments of Articles 4.2(a) and 4.2(b) \vith the aim of 
"elaborat[ing] policies and measures" and setting '"quantified 
limitation and reduction objectives \vithin specified time-frames, 
26 Id. art. 45, 31 I.L.M. at 858. 
27 Id. art. 4.4, 31 I.L.M. at 858. 
28 Id. art. 43, 31 I.L.M. at 858; see also generally Daniel Bodansh-y, Tlze 
United Nations Framework Convention 011 Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 
YALE J. lNT'L L. 451 (1993) (summarizing and analyzing the Convention and 
the negotiating process that led to the Convention). 
29 See FCCC, supra note 3, art. 3.3, 31 I.L.M. at 854 (allowing parties to 
address climate change with cooperative efforts). The definition of n is contro-
versial and the Convention does not provide for a single interpretation. The 
parties discussed and defined ll further during the Conferences of the Parties as 
provided by FCCC Article 7.2, which states that the Conference of the Parties 
shall make the necessary decisions to promote the effective implementations of 
the Convention to facilitate "the coordination of measures adopted by them to 
address climate change," id. art. 7.2, 31 I.L.M. at 860-61, and by Article 4.2(d), 
which indicates that "the Conference of the Parties, at its fU'St session, shall also 
take decisions regarding criteria for joint implementation." /d. art. 4.2(d), 31 
LL.M. at 857. 
30 See id. art. 7.4, 31 I.L.M. at 862. 
31 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Confer-
ence of the Parties: Decisions Adopted by the FU'St Session (Berlin), Mar. 28-
Apr. 7, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1671 [hereinafter Berlin Mandate]. 
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such as 2005, 2010 and 2020."32 The negotiations were to "begin 
without delay" and to "be conducted as a matter of urgency."33 
The second development at COPl was the parties' further debate 
on Joint Implementation and introduction of a JI Pilot Phase, 
which included Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ).34 The Pilot 
Phase will last until the year 2000. AIJ will be implemented 
among those Annex I parties and non-Annex parties that request 
it.35 
The Berlin Mandate is generally considered a mixed success. 
The parties did not agree on a protocol as some had hoped. The 
Mandate did, however, bring new developments and provided 
needed vigor to the FCCC by proposing the discussion of a pro-
tocol with specific time frames to further develop the commit-
ments of the Convention. The Mandate resulted in new, stronger 
alliances among parties and a more decisive position of develop· 
ing and developed countries in favor of or against commit-
ments.36 The 'G77' alliance, a coalition of less-developed 
nations, split into two groups. On one side was a new alliance 
called 'G72,' which represented developing countries that favor 
action to reduce emissions and legal commitments for developed 
countries.37 The other side contained OPEC countries isolated in 
their effort to block negotiations.38 There was a similar split 
among developed countries, with the 'green' countries of North-
em Europe supporting new stringent commitments, while the 
32 Id. Decision 1/CP.1, sec. 2, 34 I.L.M. at 1677; see also id. at 1676; THE 
EMERGING lNTERNATIONAL REmME FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (Michael Grubb 
& Dean Anderson eds., 1995). 
33 Berlin Mandate, supra note 31, Decision 1/CP.1, sec. 6, 31 I.L.M. at 1678. 
34 See id. Decision 5/CP.1, 34 I.L.M. at 1685-87. 
35 The main conclusions of Decision 5/CP.1 (on "Activities Implemented 
Jointly Under the Pilot Phase") are: (a) AIJ between Annex I and non-Annex I 
Parties will not be considered a fulfillment of current commitments; (b) no 
credits shall accrue to any Party; (c) AIJ is supplemental and does not modify 
the commitments of each Party under the Convention; (d) AIJ should be com· 
patible with and supportive of national environment and development priorities 
and require prior acceptance by the governments of the parties participating in 
these activities; (e) financing shall be additional to the financial obligations of 
parties included in Annex II as well as to current Official Development Assist· 
ance flows. See id., 34 I.L.M. at 1685-86. 
36 See Sebastian Obertilr & Herman Ott, UN/Convention on Climate 
Change: The First Conference of the Parties, 25 ENVTL. PoL'Y & L. 144, 145 
(1995). 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
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'JUSCANZ' countries (Japan, the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand) were more cautious.39 
B. COP2: Geneva, August 1996 
The second Conference of the Parties (COP2) was held in 
Geneva in August 1996. Just before COP2, two important re-
ports were published. The first was the much-awaited IPCC Sec-
ond Assessment Report, which confirmed, for the first time, that 
. anthropogenic GHG emissions were part of the cause of climate 
change.40 The SAR also analyzed scientific evidence concerning 
the rise of sea levels and the increase in the average global tem-
perature over the last 100 years. As the IPCC warned, "future 
climate change will be dominated by human influences unless 
and until the composition of the atmosphere is stabilized."41 The 
second report, published in concomitance with COP2, was a 
study by the WHO on the consequences of climate change on 
human health.42 The report forecasted an increase in malaria 
and other tropical diseases together \vith a rise in malnutrition 
and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases.43 The publication of 
these two reports brought further confirmation that global warm-
ing was an important environmental issue. The reports also cre-
ated momentum for negotiators to reach an understanding on 
new measures to be adopted. 
Another important event that helped shape COP2 was the 
U.S. delegation's announcement that it had shifted positions and 
that it now supported legally binding commitments.44 The 
United States produces over twenty percent of the world's en-
ergy related C02•45 Thus, its new position had an important im-
pact on the likelihood of success of a legally binding agreement 
to actually reduce GHG emissions. 
39 See id. 
40 See supra text accompanying notes 6-11. 
41 FRED PEARCE, EXPLAINING CLIMATE CHANGE: A WWF 0VERVJE\V OF 
THE NEw SCIENCE 1 (1996) (quoting the IPCC). 
42 See World Health Organization, Climate Change and Hzmzan Health (July 
9, 1996) <http://www.who.org/press/1996/pr96-48.html>. 
43 See id. 
44 See William F. O'Keefe, In Defense of Skepticism, Address at the Eco-
nomic Club of Detroit (Nov. 18, 1996) [hereinafter O'Keefe Address] (com-
menting on President Clinton's support of legally binding commitments) 
(transcript available at <http://www.api.org/globalclimate/1detroit.htm> ). 
45 See Rudy Perkins, Note, Electricity Deregulation, Environmental Exter-
nalities and the Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L. REv. 903, 1016 (1998). 
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These c;liverse events created a particularly fruitful situation 
for those parties that supported more stringent commitments. At 
COP2, the parties, for the first time, were ready to discuss more 
stringent commitments. At the end of COP2, the parties "took 
note" of the Geneva Ministerial Declaration (Geneva Declara-
tion), although they did not formally "adopt" the Declaration.46 
The Geneva Declaration states that the parties intend to negoti-
ate a legally-binding protocol or other legal instrument to be ap-
proved at the third Conference of the Parties (COP3).47 This 
Declaration reaffirmed the parties' commitment to the FCCC. 
The Geneva Declaration endorses and recognizes the SAR 
as "the most comprehensive and authoritative assessment of the 
science of climate change, its impact and response options now 
available."48 The Declaration states that the SAR should pro-
vide the "scientific basis for urgently strengthening action at the 
global, regional and national levels ... [to] reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases."49 After Geneva, the hope was that COP3 
would result in "policies and measures . . . [and] quantified le-
gally-binding objectives for emissions limitations and significant 
overall reductions within specified time-frames."50 
C. COP3: Kyoto, December 1997 
COP3 took place in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. The 
negotiations at COP3 proved to be quite difficult and conflicts 
among different parties arose.51 The Conference did, however, 
result in a protocol with legally binding commitments to reduce 
GHGs within a specific time-frame. Nevertheless, many parties 
were dissatisfied with the final outcome.s2 
Between COP2 and COP3, the Ad-Hoc Group on the Berlin 
Mandate (AGBM) met three times to agree on the most impor-
46 See MICHAEL Z. CurAJAR, Geneva Declaration Affirms Scientific Basis 
for Action, CLIMATE CHANGE BULL., 3d Quarter 1996, at 1, 1; see also Report 
of the Conference of the Parties on its Second Session, 2d Sess., Annex, at 71, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (1996). 
47 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Second Session, supra 
note 46, at 'li 8. 
48 Id. at 'l[ 2. 
49 ld. 
50 Id. at 'l[ 8. 
51 See Brendan P. McGivern, Introductory Note to Conference of the Par· 
ties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, 29. 
52 See id. at 22. 
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tant points of the protocol.53 Parties wishing to submit a pro-
posed protocol or other legal instruments to the Secretariat had 
to do so by January 15, 1997. Proposals called for different tim-
ing and quantity of reductions, as well as varying measures to 
implement reductions in GHGs.54 A particularly contentious is-
sue was the role developing countries should play in the effort to 
curb GHG emissions.ss 
The Kyoto Protocol, 56 the end result of COP3, provides for a 
total reduction of GHG emissions of five percent below 1990 
emissions for industrialized countries.57 This reduction is aver-
aged over the years 2008-12.58 The Protocol specifies different 
reduction limits for the various parties involved. The European 
Union agreed to reduce its emissions by eight percent, the 
United States by seven percent, and Japan by six percent.s9 
Other parties have only stabilization goals, while three parties 
(Australia, Iceland, and Norway) are allowed to increase their 
emissions.60 Policies by which such reductions will be obtained 
were not fully discussed. Further meetings are to address these 
important issues. 
The Protocol left people on both the environmental and 
business sides unsatisfied. Many business representatives com-
plained that these reductions were not economically feasible.61 
Some environmentalists argued that the Protocol would be insuf-
ficient to protect the earth's climate.62 Although it needs further 
refining, the results are important and the Protocol sends a clear 
?3 See John Lanchbery, What to Expect from Kyoto, ENVIRONMENT, Nov. 1, 
1997, at 4. 
54 See Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)-Meetings Re-
port-Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate: Sixth Session & tlze FCCC Subsid-
iary Bodies {last modified Dec. 1, 1997) <http://www.erin.gov.au/portfolio/csdl 
climatefmternational/agbm6.html>. 
55 See McGivern, supra note 51, 37 I.L.M. at 26. 
56 Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto 
Protocol]. 
57 See id. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33. 
58 See id. 
59 See McGivern, supra note 51, 37 I.L.M. at 24. 
60 See id. 
61 See, e.g., Global Climate Coalition, Fuzal Agreement: More Tlzan3 Million 
Lost Jobs, Higher Costs for Food, Housing, Transportation, 5 CUl\fATE WATCH 
BRIEF 1 (Dec. 10, 1997) <http://www.globalclimate.org/watchldecl0·97.htm>. 
62 See, e.g., Greenpeace: Climate Agreement Endangers the Climate (Dec. 11, 
1997) <http://www.greenpeace.org/-climate!kdatesldecember11.html>. 
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sign that nations are able to agree on certain reductions of 
GHGs.63 
III 
NoN-GOVERNMENTAL AcroRs IN THE FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
The climate change negotiations established a precedent for 
the involvement of non-governmental actors in the negotiation of 
international treaties. Non-governmental groups participated in 
various degrees throughout the entire process of the climate 
change meetings.64 The input and scientific contributions of 
NGOs were important to the development of the FCCC. 
Articles 4.1(i), 7.2(1), and 7.6 of the FCCC address the role 
of non-governmental organizations. Article 7.6 establishes the 
rule for admission to proceedings, stating: 
[A]ny body or agency, whether national or international, gov-
ernmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters 
covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secre-
tariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Confer-
ence of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless 
at least one-third of the Parties present object.65 
Article 4.l(i) recognizes that NGOs are important to stimu~ 
lating and increasing public awareness on climate change.66 It 
states that all parties shall "promote and cooperate in education, 
training and public awareness related to climate change and en~ 
courage the widest participation in this process, including that of 
non-governmental organizations. "67 Article 7 .2(1) addresses the 
issue of supervision of the implementation of the Convention by 
the Conference of the Parties, stating that the COP shall "seek 
and utilize, where appropriate, the service and co-operation of, 
and information provided by, competent international organiza~ 
tions and intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies. "68 
NGOs were involved in the negotiations of the Convention 
from a very early stage and provided a different perspective from 
government actors. During the negotiations, NGOs were al-
63 See McGivern, supra note 51, 37 I.L.M. at 29 (scheduling further discus-
sions for late 1998 in Buenos Aires, Argentina). 
64 See Doherty, supra note 19, at 199. 
65 FCCC, supra note 3, art. 7.6, 31 I.L.M. at 862. 
66 See id. art. 4.1(i), 31 I.L.M. at 856. 
67 Id. 
68 ld. art. 7.2(1), 31 I.L.M. at 861. 
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lowed to participate in formal meetings as observers and could, 
during plenary conferences, intervene from the floor for an allot-
ted amount of time.69 Non-governmental organizations also 
made fruitful use of their scientific expertise in climate change 
and utilized the mass media skillfully.70 At COP2, the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) adopted 
a resolution that requested -the Secretariat to study a more effi-
cient mechanism to allow NGOs increased access to the 
Convention.n 
A. Environmental Non-governmental Organizations in the 
Climate Change Debate 
Environmental NGOs began to participate in the negotia-
tions of the Climate Change Convention at a very early stage and 
continued to play a major role throughout the COPs.n Approxi-
mately 100 representatives of thirty ENGOs attended the Con-
ferences of the Parties. At the intermediate meetings, fewer 
ENGO delegates tended to participate; their attendance often 
depended upon the types of issues to be discussed at a meeting.73 
The most influential and active ENGOs were advocacy groups 
representing both 'mainstream' (World \Vide Fund for Nature 
(WWF) and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)) and 'deep 
ecologist' (Greenpeace and Sierra Club) ideologies, from both 
international (Greenpeace) and national (Ozone Action and 
EDF) perspectives. Certain groups, such as the EDF, came to 
69 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, U.N. 
FCCC, 1st Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4(b), at 2 n.l, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/ 
1995/2 {1995); see also id. Provisional Agenda Item 4(e), at 1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/ 
CP/1995/3 (1995); Doherty, supra note 19, at 207. 
70 See Doherty, supra note 19, at 201. 
71 In the following meeting in March 1997 in Bonn, however, the study for 
an NGO consultative mechanism was postponed to the next session. See Report 
of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on the U'cJrk of 
Its Second Session, U.N. FCCC, 2d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 7, at 11, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/1996/4 (1996). 
72 See generally GARETH PoRTER & JANET WELSH BROWN, GLOBAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL PoLmcs (1995) (defining ENGOs and offering an analysis of their 
history and development); see also Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-governmental 
Organizations in the Development of International Environmental Law, 6S CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 61 (1992) (explaining how NGOs have e"-panded their influence 
in the international environmental sphere). 
73 For example, only 34 representatives participated in AGBM3, while about 
90 went to ABGM6 in Bonn in March 1997. See Norz-Govemmental Organiza-
tions (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/events/sbfeb97/ 
ngo.htm>. 
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the negotiations with significant expertise in litigation and inter-
national treaty drafting. Many research institutes and project-fo-
cused NGOs were also present. 
NGOs that played an important role in the evolution of the 
negotiations include: 
Climate Action Network (CAN): a coalition of ENGOs in-
volved in the negotiations of the Climate Change Convention. 
CAN is divided into regional groups, including Africa, Europe, 
Asia, Latin America, and the United States. As an umbrella or-
ganization, CAN coordinates the positions of NGOs during ne-
gotiations and expresses the views of its members.74 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF): a mainstream ENGO 
based in the United States that deals mostly with policy and legal 
issues. EDF was an important player in the negotiations be-
cause, contrary to most other ENGOs, it supported market-
based economic measures.75 
Greenpeace: an international advocacy ENGO with a deep 
ecologist ideology. Greenpeace is well known for its spectacular 
actions and outspoken methods.'6 
Ozone Action: a small, deep ecologist ENGO based in the 
United States with its headquarters in Washington, D.C. It is the 
only ENGO discussed in this Article that is not a member of 
CAN.77 
Sierra Club: a deep ecologist, North American ENGO. 
Worldwatch Institute (WWI): a research institute ENGO, 
heavily involved in the negotiations on climate change. It is an 
environmental advisor to the Business Council for Sustainable 
Energy (BCSE), an industry group formed by representatives of 
renewable energy sources and natural gas.78 
74 See Climate Action Network, About CAN (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http:// 
www.climatenetwork.org/#About CAN>. 
75 See Environmental Defense Fund, About EDF: EDF at a Glance (visited 
Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.EDF.org/AboutEDF!b_atglance.html>. 
76 See PoRTER & BRoWN, supra note 72, at 51. 
77 See Ozone Action, Background and Publications, Staff and Board of Di-
rectors: 1996, 1997, and 1998 Funders (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.ozone. 
org/back//.html>. 
78 See Worldwatch Institute, Worldwatch Mission (visited Feb. 16, 1999) 
<http://worldwatch.org/wi/index.html>; see also The Business Council for Sus-
tainable Energy, Council's Environmental Advisory Committee (visited Feb. 16, 
1999) <http://www.bcse.org/enviro.html>. 
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World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF): an apolitical, main-
stream NGO based in Switzerland but active worldwide.79 
Other ENGOs, such as Friends of the Earth and the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), also participated in the ne-
gotiations to varying degrees. ENGOs unanimously support the 
view that global warming is a reality caused mostly by human 
activities, such as industrial emissions, agricultural practices, and 
deforestation. ENGOs support the conclusions of the IPCC con-
tained in the SAR80 and have sponsored alternative studies that 
promote early action to avoid serious consequences to people 
and nature in the near future.81 ENGOs assert that the threats 
the Earth is facing are serious and that irreversible damages will 
result from inaction. For example, Greenpeace's Report on 
Global Warming states that "the prospects of the future environ-
mental security being compromised by global warming are now 
so real as to make adoption of a precautionary response impera-
tive ... [P]olicy-makers should be clearly aware that waiting in 
perpetuity for better scientific data entails the real risk of waiting 
until is too late."82 Bill Hare of Greenpeace International de-
clared at COPl that "[t]he industrialized world must agree to se-
rious reduction in C02 to avoid the financial and human costs of 
increased fl.ooding."83 Similarly, the Sierra Club Board of Direc-
tors adopted a policy statement that concluded that "[t]he danger 
posed to the environment by the current and projected release of 
pollutants that are affecting the thermal balance of the atmos-
phere . . .· is so great that mitigation measures must be taken 
now."84 Similar positions are held by mainstream ENGOs. The 
WWF stated, for example, that "[c]limate change will have wide-
79 See World Wide Fund for Nature, WWF (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http:// 
www.Pandaorg/resourcesffactsheets/generaVfct_wwf2.htm>. 
80 See supra text accompanying notes 6-11. 
81 Greenpeace International, for example, cited a study by Professor Pier 
Vellinga of Amsterdam Free University that warned against the serious risks of 
floods due to global wamling effects. See Frequently Asked Questions About 
Global Wanning, Climate Change and the Greenhouse Effect § 10 (visited Feb. 
16, 1999) <http://rtk.netlE10101T659> (concluding that increases in rain and 
river flow, consistent with global wamring, have already occurred). 
82 GLOBAL WARMING: THE GREENPEACE REPORT 460 (Jeremy Leggett ed., 
1990). 
83 Gennan Utility RWE Sues Greenpeace Amid New Signs of Climate 
Change {Mar. 30, 1995) <http://www.greenpeace.org/-climate/berlin1995/ 
index.html#report4>. 
84 Sierra Club, Protect America's Environment: For Our Families, For Our 
Future (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/ozone.html>. 
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ranging and mostly damaging impacts on human health .... We 
cannot afford to continue 'business-as-usual.' Changing course 
will not be easy, but is necessary.''BS 
In general, ENGOs tend to focus on sector-specific measM 
ures and they only partially support market-based approaches. 
Most ENGOs support specific carbon-free fuels and legislative 
tools. For example, the Sierra Club supports an increase in the 
current Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard, 
more energy efficient heating, cooling and lighting systems, inM 
creased performance from home appliances and industrial maM 
chinery, and better insulated buildings.86 Sierra Club also 
campaigns for the removal of subsidies for fossil fuels and nuM 
clear power, and the increased use of safe alternative technoloM 
gies, such as wind and solar power.87 Similarly, Greenpeace "is 
working to shift global energy dependence from environmentally 
dangerous sources of energy, such as fossil fuels and nuclear enM 
ergy, to ecologically sustainable solar energy. Greenpeace wants 
industrialized countries to convert their current energy generatM 
ing systems to renewable technologies at a minimum of 3% per 
year.''88 It strongly supports the use of solar power but opposes 
the further use of natural gas and nuclear power.89 
Other ENGOs support more general approaches. The 
NRDC recommends incentives for alternative energy, especially 
fuels for transportation, and an increase in fuel ef:ficiency,9o The 
EDF does not support particular measures, but instead emphaM 
sizes the need to achieve the goal of cutting emissions instead of 
focusing on the path chosen to get there.91 Both the EDF and 
the NRDC support the use of natural gas as a substitute for more 
carbon intensive fuels.92 The WWF sponsored a study on measM 
85 World Wide Fund for Nature, Conclusions (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http:// 
www.panda.org/resources/publications/climate/Health_Issue/page9.htm>. 
86 See Patricia Glick, Global Warming: The High Costs of Inaction (visited 
Feb. 16, 1999) <http://tamalpais.sierraclub.org/global %2dwarming/inaction. 
html>. 
!r7 See id. 
88 The Greenpeace International Climate Campaign (visited Feb. 16, 1999) 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/-climate/climatesum.html>. 
89 See id. 
90 See Daniel A. Lashof, Cool Solutions for Global Warming (on file with 
author). 
91 See Environmental Defense Fund Strategic Plan (visited Feb. 16, 1999) 
<http://www.edf.org/pubs/strategicplan/>. 
92 See Robert E. Thhnke, Kicking America's Oil Habit (visited Feb. 16, 
1999) <http://www.edf.org/pubs/edf2Dletter/199111%5Fhabitat.html>. 
Ima ed with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 
1999] NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE 217 
ures that the European Union could adopt to reduce emissions to 
the level proposed by the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS). Its approach uses a variety of measures including in-
creasing efficiency standards and the use of renewable energy 
sources.93 
Environmental NGOs disagree, to a certain extent, as to the 
kinds of action that should be taken to address the issue of cli-
mate change. These differences are most visible in their choices 
of timetables, targets, policies, and measures. Some ENGOs sup-
port decisive actions and drastic cuts in fossil fuels, while others 
support market-based approaches and more varied actions. For 
example, CAN-U.S. supported the proposal of the AOSIS to re-
duce 1990 emissions by twenty percent by the year 2005.94 The 
EDF agreed to a maximum temperature increase of one degree 
Celsius per century and maximum GHG concentration of 450 
parts per million.95 However,, differences did exist within the 
U.S. coalition. The Sierra Club, for example, asked for more 
stringent commitments from the United States and proposed a 
twenty-five percent reduction target by the year 2005.96 Other 
ENGOs considered the AOSIS target unrealistic because of the 
short time left to the year 2005, but they still politically supported 
it.97 
93 See World Wide Fund for Nature Climate Change Campaign, Climate So-
lutions: Growth with Less Energy (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.panda.orgl 
climate/solutions>. Ozone Action published short position papers in support of 
the IPCC cost-benefit analysis and urged actions to implement measures to cut 
emissions. See Ozone Action, Ozone Action: Global Wanning Page (visited 
Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.ozone.org/page20.html>. Some ENGOs, however, 
do not agree on cost-benefit analysis. Sierra Club criticizes the cost-benefit ap-
proach because it puts a price on goods that cannot be priced (like the loss of 
human life, social distress caused by severe weather, and the loss of biodivers-
ity). Sierra Club also criticizes the use of discounting and aggregation, and 
claims that discounting undervalues the costs of global warming on future gen-
erations and that aggregating results undermines the fact that the effects of 
global warming vary considerably in every region. See Glick, supra note 86, 
<http://tamalpais.sierraclub.org/global%2dwarming(maction.htm1Wfrue>. 
94 See Carol Werner & Jennifer Morgan, Cities Endorse AOSIS Protocol, 
ECO, Mar. 30, 1995, at 1. 
95 See Interview with Karan Capoor, Policy Analyst, Environmental De-
fense Fund, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 1997). 
96 See Sierra Club, We Must Act Now to Curb Global Wamzing (visited Feb. 
16, 1999) <http://www.sierraclub.orglnews/global-warmingl0005.html>. 
<n See Interview with Christopher Flavin, Senior Vice President, World watch 
Institute, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 1997). 
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The flexible targets and multi-annual emissions budgets pro-
posed by the U.S. delegation were very controversial among en-
vironmental NGOs. The majority of ENGOs supported 
stringent measures and fixed targets and timetables, while others 
supported the U.S. proposal of a multi-annual emissions 
budget.9s The U.S. proposal for Kyoto provided for ten-year 
budgets for C02 that each Annex I country would achieve indi-
vidually.99 In doing so, each country would be able to borrow 
(with a penalty) from subsequent years if it needed to reach its 
commitment. The proposal allows trading of C02 emissions per-
mits if a country has a surplus of them after meeting its own com-
mitments.t0o The EDF especially supports this proposal and 
helped to define it.1o1 
Most ENGOs also agree that developed countries should be 
more responsible for cutting GHG emissions. Kirsky Hamilton 
of Greenpeace International suggested that "[i]t is up to the de-
veloped world, which produces 75% of the world's man-made 
C02 emissions, to make these cuts, and help developing countries 
make the switch to renewable forms of energy, such as solar en-
ergy."102 Peter Otinda of Climate Network Mrica noted that 
"negotiations on the problems of global change must take cogni-
zance of its socio-economic causes . . . . [A]ny approach that 
ignores this issue of equity is bound to fai1."103 Recent develop-
ments, however, show that some ENGOs agree that developing 
countries should be included in some form of stabilization 
agreement.104 
98 See Interview with Kelly Sims, Science Policy Director, Ozone Action, in 
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 1997) (stating that EDF supports the U.S. proposal). 
99 See id. 
10o See Obertiir & Ott, supra note 36, at 147. 
101 See Interview with Cliff Wood, Climate Action Network, in Washington, 
D.C. (Jan. 21, 1997). 
102 Greenpeace International, Greenpeace Climbers Still on Smokestack: In· 
dustrialised Nations Are Climate Killers (Mar. 28, 1995) <http://www.green· 
peace.org/-climatelberlin1995/index.html#report2>. 
103 Peter Otinda, Negotiate But . . . No Solution Without Equity Considera· 
tion, ECO, July 8, 1996, at 3, 3. 
104 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Global Warming: Dispatches from 
the Climate Summit at Kyoto (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.edf.org/issues/ 
Kyoto.html> (stating that one of the six critical elements indicated by EDF for 
environmental success includes "a path leading toward participation by devel· 
oping nations"). 
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B. Intra-group Relations Among ENGOs 
The ENGOs that were more active in the climate change 
negotiations were mostly advocacy ENGOs, although some 
groups belonging to other categories (such as operational and re-
search institutes) were active as well. ENGOs were generally 
united on issues and shared the same position on a relatively sub-
stantial number of issues. At the negotiations, they also shared 
facilities and collaborated in the publication of ECO, a pro-envi-
ronmental newsletter. Most of the ENGOs that participated in 
the climate change discussions were members of CAN and 
worked in a coalition for the negotiations of the Convention. 
Scientific papers were reviewed by CAN and a common position 
was elaborated by the group.1os 
Although advocacy ENGOs shared most of their character-
istics and positions, some tensions did exist among them. Envi-
ronmental NGOs can be divided.into 'mainstream' groups and 
'deep ecologists,'106 and the tensions that surfaced were generally 
attributable to this ideological difference. Disagreements among 
mainstream and deep ecologists have persisted for a long time 
and are not confined to the climate change issue. Some main-
stream groups are criticized for their past efforts to cooperate 
'vith governments and business groups. The EDF, for example, 
was admonished for trying to cut special deals on the 1990 
amendments to the U.S. Clean Air Act without consulting other 
ENGOs.l07 Sometimes, for negotiating purposes, ENGOs pre-
tend to be in more disagreement than they really are. For exam-
ple, Greenpeace can play "good cop/bad cop" with the EDF in 
order to obtain a more favorable outcome at negotiations.lOS 
Because of these ideological differences, members of CAN 
at the FCCC reached conclusions only on limited issues and not 
on the complete spectrum of issues related to the Convention. 
While member-NGOs could agree on a final target and timetable 
for reduction, as well as the decision to support the AOSIS pro-
posal, they could not reach agreement on the measures and poli-
cies by which parties would achieve this goal. The EDF, a 
105 See Interview with Cliff Wood, supra note 101. 
106 See WALTER A. RosENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL PoUTICS AND Poucv 
28-32 {1995). 
107 See Interview with Kelly Sims, supra note 98; see also Interview with Ka-
lee Kreider, Program Director of Climate/Energy Campaign, Greenpcacc, in 
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22, 1997). 
108 See Interview with Kalee Kreider, supra note 107. 
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mainstream ENGO, supported market-based mechanisms.1°9 
Deep ecologist ENGOs, like Greenpeace and the Sierra Club, 
disagreed. Greenpeace favored the use of renewable energies, 
especially solar,11° while the Sierra Club pushed for an increase 
in CAFE standards.111 Similarly, ENGOs did not have a uniform 
position on joint implementation. EDF favored joint implemen-
tation among Annex I parties,112 while the Sierra Club did not 
accept it under any circumstances.113 
C. Business Non-governmental Organizations in the Climate 
Change Debate 
Business NGOs are interest groups that unite several com-
panies to campaign for a specific point of view. Many BNGOs 
were involved in the negotiations of the Climate Change Con-
vention and their presence in the debate increased as the crea-
tion of binding commitments became more real. Eric 
Holdsworth from the Global Climate Coalition noticed that 
"sometime after COP1, industry representatives became more 
numerous than environmental NGOs representatives."114 Since 
then, the gap has only widened. At some more recent negotia-
tions, there were twice as many industrial representatives as 
there were ENGO representatives.115 At the Sixth Session of the 
Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM6) in Bonn in 
March 1997, there were more than 150 representatives from 
about thirty-five different industry groups in attendance, as com-
109 See Global Wanning Treaty: Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on 
Agric., Forestry and Nutrition, 105th Cong. (Mar. 5, 1998) (statement of Fred 
Krupp, Executive Director, Environmental Defense Fund), available in 1998 
WL 8992982. 
110 See The Greenpeace International Climate Campaign (visited Feb. 16, 
1999) <41ttp://www.greenpeace.org/climate/climatesum.html>. · 
111 See Global Climate Negotiations: Hearing Before the House Comm. on 
lnt'l Relations, 105th Cong. 49,50 (1997) (statement of Daniel Becker, Director, 
Sierra Club Global Warming and Energy Program) (explaining the Sierra 
Club's support of CAFE standards). 
112 See Environmental Defense Fund, Global Wanning: Dispatches from the 
Climate Summit at Kyoto (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://W)VW.edf.org/issues/Ky· 
oto.html>. 
113 See Risky Business: Trading Away Our Responsibilities (visited Aprilll, 
1999) <http://tamalpais.sierraclub.org/global %2dwarming/riskybusiness.html>. 
114 Interview with Eric Holdsworth, Deputy Executive Director, Global Cli· 
mate Coalition, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 1997). 
115 See id. 
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pared to only ninety representatives from about twenty-five 
ENGOs. 
In the debate on climate change, some BNGOs represent 
specific industry sectors with similar interests in the outcome of 
the negotiations,l16 while others represent industrial interests in 
general, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD). Since COP2, BNGOs have endorsed two separate 
statements: one from mainstream industry groups and one from 
industry groups representing renewable energies, cogeneration, 
natural gas, and energy efficient technologies.l17 
The most important economic sectors and the BNGOs that 
represent them are the following: 
Coal and oil companies and the energy intensive industries11B 
are represented by many relatively conservative BNG0s.n9 The 
most conservative group is the Climate Council.120 Another con-
servative group is the Global Climate Coalition (GCC),121 based 
in Washington, D.C., which has financed numerous economic 
116 The Global Climate Coalition (GCC) represented oil companies and 
heavy energy users, and the European Business Council for a Sustainable Fu-
ture represented European renewables. 
117 See Workshop on Consultative Mechanisms for Non-Governmental Or-
ganization Inputs to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (visited Nov. 7, 1998) <http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/docsJl996/sbsta! 
misc02.htm>. 
118 These include alunlinum producers, the iron and steel industry, paper 
companies, and plastics producers. 
119 In many cases, companies are members of more than one group repre-
senting diverse views. There are at least two reasons that explain this phenome-
non. First, multinational companies can have more than one interest (e.g., a 
company can produce fuels from oil, gas, and coal while simultaneously seeking 
to expand its chemicals business); thus, they may need to be present on more 
than one sector-specific BNGO. Second, their position may vary from country 
to country, and sister companies of the same multinational groups can choose, 
as they are normally free to do, to be members of differentially conservative or 
open business NGOs. 
120 Dan Pearlman, an attorney who represented the group at the negotia-
tions, tried to prevent any kind of agreement and helped OPEC representatives 
in writing interventions and in suggesting ways to block and delay decisions. 
See Fred Pearce, Playing Dirty in Kyoto, NEW SCIENnST, Jan. 17, 1998, at 48. 
121 The GCC has 42 board members and 17 general members. The board 
members include Air 'fransport Association, Alunlinum Association, Inc., At-
lantic Richfield Coal Company, Chemical Manufacturers Association, Chevron, 
Exxon, Ford, General Motors, Texaco, and others. The general members, who 
pay $2500 rather than $20,000, include Amoco, BHP :Minerals, Dow Chemicals, 
Goodyear Tlre & Rubber Company, and Shell Oil Company. The GCC was 
named by the Climate Action Network as one of the "dirty dozen" companies 
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studies on the potential impacts and costs resulting from GHG 
reductions. The American Petroleum Institute (API) represents 
the positions of American oil companies on many issues.122 API 
actively participated in the negotiations and financed a study to 
analyze the costs of implementing reduction targets.123 Less con-
servative BNGOs representing mostly fossil fuel, transportation, 
and energy intensive sectors include the ICC, the WBCSD, and 
the U.S. Council for International Business (USCIB).124 
The chemical sector125 is represented by the International 
Climate Change Partnership (ICCP),126 a group based in Virginia 
which supports long-term comprehensive goals and market-
based solutions to climate change.127 
who have "played an obstructive role in the climate change negotiations." Who 
Is the Worst of the Worst of the 'Dirty Dozen'?, ECO, Dec. 4, 1997, at 4, 4. 
122 The Executive Vice President of API, William O'Keefe, gave a speech 
before the Economic Club of Detroit in which he strongly attacked President 
Clinton's commitments to legally binding emission reductions and recom-
mended taking a skeptical view of the science of climate change and the costs 
on the economy. See O'Keefe Address, supra note 44. 
123 See Interview with Russell 0. Jones, Senior Economist, American Petro-
leum Institute, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 12, 1997). 
124 It is sometimes difficult to differentiate among the BNGOs and their posi-
tions since some BNGOs are members of other BNGOs. The GCC, for exam-
ple, is a member of the U.S. Council for International Business, and API is a 
member of GCC. These groups sometimes share part of their top managers. 
O'Keefe, for example, is Executive Vice-President of API and Chairman of the 
GCC. 
125 The chemical sector became involved in the climate change debate at an 
early stage, as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and their substitutes were named as 
gases that have an ozone-depleting effect. CFCs contribute significantly to 
GHG warming and their influence is studied carefully by the scientific commu-
nity. The Montreal Protocol, which since 1987 has been ratified by more than 
150 countries, provides for a complete phase-out of CFCs. See Montreal Proto-
col, supra note 23, art. 2, 26 I.L.M. at 1552; see also INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON· 
MENTAL LAw 492 (Michael R. Molitor et al. eds., 1991). Scientists have 
demonstrated, however, that substitutes developed by industry to replace CFCs 
have warming potential as well. See Hilary F. French, Learning from the Ozone 
Experience, in STATE oF THE WoRLD 151 (Lester R. Brown et al. eds., 1997). 
126 The ICCP, like the Climate Council, is based in a law firm. Members of 
the ICCP include 3M Company, Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute, 
AT&T, BP America, Dow, Dupont, Elf Atochem, European Fluorocarbon 
Technical Committee, and General Electric. More conservative chemicals in-
dustries such as Dow Chemical are also members of the GCC. 
127 See International Industry Coalition Urges Governments and Industry to 
Join to Create Effective Global Climate Change Process, PR NEwsWIRE, Mar. 6, 
1996, available in WL, ALLNEWSPLUS Database. 
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Insurance and re-insurance companies,t28 also present at the 
negotiations, are interesting examples of companies that would 
suffer the consequences of the projected global warming.t29 
However, the insurance and re-insurance sectors do not share a 
common position on the issue of climate change. American com-
panies are not involved in the negotiations. European insurance 
and re-insurance companies, on the other hand, are interested in 
the negotiations and in the issue of climate change. In 1990, dec-
larations from the European insurance and re-insurance compa-
nies already linked :financial losses from bad weather conditions 
to the change in climate patterns.13° European companies, how-
ever, are "active observers" rather than fully participating lobby-
ists. They do not lobby strongly for particular positions and 
have not distinguished themselves from the positions of other in-
dustries present at the negotiations.131 
128 In the last decade, insurance and re-insurance industries e:-:perienccd un-
precedented losses due to weather disasters, although the IPCC could not con-
firm that anthropogenic climate change had a role in these disasters. See SAR, 
supra note 6, § 17. In the future, climate change has the potential to destabilize 
the insurance market if the patterns of climatic change are not understood and 
the risks are misinterpreted or underestimated. 
129 There are more than $2 trillion of insured assets in the U.S. coastlines 
alone. See Mark Hertsgaard, Insurance Finns, Banks Battle Big Oil, SACRA· 
MENTO BEE, Feb. 4, 1996, at Forum 1. 
130 H.R Kaufman, General Manager of Swiss Re, declared in 1990 that 
"[t]here is a significant body of scientific evidence indicating that last year's 
record insured losses from natural catastrophes was not a random occurrence. 
Instead it may be the result of climatic changes that will enormously ex-pand the 
liability of the property-casualty industry." JEREMY LEGGE'IT, GREENPEACE 
INTERNATIONAL, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE INsuRANCE INDUSTRY: Sou. 
DARITY AMONG THE RisK CoMMUNITY? 27 (ca. 1993) (on file With author); see 
also Munich Re, 1996 Another Year of Natural Catastrophes (visited Feb. 16, 
1999) <http://www.munichre.com/press/pressl961223_eng.htm> (containing a 
Dec. 23, 1996 press release from Munich Re, the largest re-insurance company 
in the world, concerning losses from natural catastrophes). 
131 Both Swiss Re and Munich Re, the world's two biggest reinsurance com-
panies, planned to send observers to COPl. See US ll!Surers Meet with Vice 
Presidel!t on Climate Change, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE REP., Feb. 24, 1995, 
available in 1995 WL 8443827. Sinillarly, Carlos Joly, of UN! Strorebrand, Nor-
way's largest insurer, declared that "[g]lobal warming to many of us in the in-
dustry is not a question of if it \viii happen, but what is happening now." Global 
Wanning Spurs New Developments in ll!Surance, Banking, GLOBAL WARMING 
NETWORK ONUNE, July 18, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2265919. 
Ima ed with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 
224 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Volume 7 
The renewable energy sector132 benefits the most from a pol-
icy of reduced global dependence on fossil fuels.133 The renewa-
ble sector is represented by the United States Business Council 
for Sustainable Energy (USBCSE). This group was formed in 
1992 with the help of some ENGOs, particularly the World 
Watch Institute. In Europe, the European Business Council for a 
Sustainable Energy Future ( e5), created in 1996, represents en-
ergy efficiency, cogeneration, and renewable energy companies. 
Renewables are still a relatively small industry, but their pres-
ence at the negotiations was important to demonstrate that the 
industry was not completely united and that more than one point 
of view needed to be considered for business. 
Before the publication of the Second Assessment Report in 
1995, BNGOs often contested the scientific findings with respect 
to climate change. BNGOs questioned the validity of the find-
ings, the proceedings, and the integrity of the IPCC in an attempt 
to discredit the scientific conclusions.t34 
132 The renewable sector includes solar and wind energy producers, cogener-
ation, energy efficiency, and natural gas companies. See NANCY K. KuBASEK & 
GARY S. SILVERMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238 (1994). 
133 The renewable sector began to get involved in the negotiations rather re-
cently, and their presence among other industry groups is acquiring importance. 
At COP2, the renewable industry for the first time presented an separate inter-
vention from the floor at the Plenary session. Similarly, at AGBM6-the fol-
lowing meeting-industry groups representing renewables and natural gas 
presented a separate statement. At AGBM6, the BCSE stressed its link to 
other BNGOs and declared that its members "agree with much of the business 
community in many issues, but not always on climate change and energy pol-
icy," so as to remind the others that it was a member of the industry despite its 
lobbying for emissions reductions. Paul E. Metz, Statement Before AGBM6, the 
Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate, Sixth Session, Bonn, March 5, 1997, on 
Behalf of the United States Business Council for Sustainable Energy and the Eu-
ropean Business Council for a Sustainable Energy Future-e-to-the-power-of-5 
(visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.e5.org/pages/st-01e.htm> [hereinafter State-
ment Before AGBM6]. 
134 Professor Patrick Michaels of the University of Virginia declared that 
scientists supporting the issue of global warming resisted critical exantination of 
the subject, and George Laver of the Atlantic Richfield Company said that the 
U.N. had deleted passages of skeptical scientists in their reports. See Alan Kov-
ski, Battle Against Global Wanning Moves to Geneva This Week, OIL DAILY, 
Mar. 5, 1996, at 4. Similarly, Frederick Seitz, President Emeritus of Rockefeller 
University and Chairman of the George C. Marshall Institute, claimed that he 
had "never witnessed a more disturbing corruption of the peer-review process 
than the events that led to this IPCC report." Frederick Seitz, Editorial, A Ma-
jor Deception on 'Global Wanning', WALL ST. J., June 12, 1996, at A16. EN· 
GOs harshly criticized these attempts to discredit the science behind global 
warming. See, e.g., Kelly Sims, Gone Completely Crazy, ECO, July 8,1996, at 1. 
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The publication of the SAR, with its first-time recognition 
that human behavior has an impact on global warming and the 
endorsement of its conclusions by the international community, 
shifted the focus in the debate over science. Even though some 
groups still criticized parts of the science of climate change, the 
existence of climate change was acknowledged by many of the 
BNGOs as well as by the international community.l3S Questions 
remained on the extent of climate change, on the validity of fu-
ture projections, and on the weight and importance of those un-
certainties that still surrounded the issue. There was, therefore, a 
need for further scientific research. The GCC, for example, 
agreed after the IPCC that the SAR was the most comprehensive 
report on climate change, but still emphasized the need to con-
duct further research before the parties took any action to com-
bat climate change. It stated that "[e]xisiting scientific evidence 
does not support actions aimed solely at reducing or stabilizing 
greenhouse gas emissions."136 According to the GCC, any action 
to prevent or reduce GHG emissions would have such a major 
impact on the U.S. carbon-based economy that a greater under-
standing of the climate system was necessary before the parties 
embarked on any r~duction.137 Similarly, the USCffi, a member 
of the ICC, said that more time was needed to understand the 
issue.l38 These groups supported more scientific research on is-
sues like carbon captured by oceans and a more detailed quanti-
fication of temperature variation and sea level rise.139 These 
ECO also reported that "[a]ttempts by groups such as the Global Climate Coa-
lition, representing the interests of coal, oil and automobile companies working 
in concert with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to discredit the IPCC report are 
bluntly self-serving. The attack on the IPCC and its Lead Authors are just plain 
lies." No Discernible Impact on Emissions, ECO, July 8, 1996, at 1, 2. ENGOs 
also stated that "the IPCC has provided more information about human in-
duced climate change than has been known about any previous global threat" 
and that "the GCC's misinformation campaign is unrelenting." Sims, supra, at 
1. 
135 For example, William O'Keefe, Chairman of the GCC, acknowledged that 
the "scientific theory is valid" and that "the potential for enhanced global cli-
mate change is real," but he added that "the degree of likely change and the 
best responses are profoundly uncertain subjects." Kovski, supra note 134, at 4. 
136 Global Climate Coalition, GCC's Position on tlte Climate Issue (visited 
Feb. 19, 1999) <http://www.globalclimate.orglmission.htm>. 
137 See id. 
138 See Interview \vith Norine Kennedy, Vice President of Environmental Af-
fairs, United States Council for International Business, in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 
16, 1997). 
139 See id. 
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BNGOs suggest that waiting before acting will not result in dam-
ages to the environment or the population because uncertainties 
still exist and technical developments will make emissions easier 
to control. . For example, William O'Keefe declared that "[w]e 
could wait 20 to 25 years to take action until scientific uncertainty 
is lessened. "140 
Other BNGOs have argued that, while more research would 
be useful, some immediate action is necessary. Kevin Fay, Exec-
utive Director of the ICCP, shared some doubts concerning the 
"relationship between the emissions of these [greenhouse] gases, 
their retention in the atmosphere, and the potential effects on the 
planet's climate."141 However, he called for an active role of in-
dustry, science, and policy makers to formulate "a successful so-
lution to managing the risk associated with global climate 
change."142 The WBCSD Annual Review of Activities stated 
that although the scientific debate about the effect of the 'green-
house gases' on global warming will continue, "it is prudent for 
business to play its part by looking for ways to reduce emissions 
of those gases."143 Furthermore, one of the seven principles for 
which the eS decided to lobby at the negotiations was that 
"[s]cientific results of international climate and research such as 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) should 
be the basis of rational climate policies. "144 
Similarly, some European insurance and re-insurance com-
panies shared the position of ENGOs on the scientific evidence 
of climate change and on the need for timely action to reduce 
emissions. These companies agreed that climate change repre-
sents a major threat to the environment.14S Since 1989, in fact, 
the insurance sector has experienced a major increase in expend-
itures due to natural catastrophes.146 Following COPlin Berlin, 
the position of some of the biggest Eirropean insurers and re-
insurers (like Munich Re and Swiss Re) has moved to favor 
140 Sims, supra note 134, at 1. 
141 International Industry Coalition Urges Governments and Industry to Join 
to Create Effective Global Climate Change Process, supra note 127. 
142 /d. 
143 World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Climate and En-
ergy (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.wbcsd.ch/climatel.htm>. 
144 Energy: Business Forms Sustainable Energy Council, BuR. ENV'T, Feb. 20, 
1996, at 1, 2-3. 
145 See Global Warming Spurs New Developments in Insurance, Banking, 
supra note 131. 
146 See Insurers Call for Action, ECO, July 10, 1996, at 3. 
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· measures reducing emissions.147 The collection of evidence and 
the involvement of insurers in the debate have also been influ-
enced by the heavy lobbying of Greenpeace, which sponsored ef-
fective conferences for insurers prior to the Berlin conference. 
In a report issued by British insurers for the British government, 
published concurrently with COP2, insurers declared that they 
were "at risk of a major increase in claims over the next 50 years 
as a result of global warming."148 Swiss insurance executive H.R. 
Kaufman declared that a "[f]ailure to act would leave the insur-
ance industry and its policyholders vulnerable to truly disastrous 
consequences."149 At COP2, during a workshop organized by 
the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), fifty-
eight representatives from insurance and re-insurance companies 
from all over the world issued a position paper calling for "early 
substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions."15D 
European and U.S. insurance and re-insurance companies, 
however, approach the issue of climate change in significantly 
different ways.151 Companies in the United States are addressing 
the problem of losses first by trying to understand climatic cycles 
better through an analysis of the risks involved in climatic events 
and then by adjusting the prices of insurance to cover those 
risks.152 In contrast, the European insurance and re-insurance in-
dustry is researching the causes of global warming and becoming 
involved in the process that is leading to more stringent timeta-
bles and targets on GHG emissions. 
Most of the BNGOs support the application of binding com-
mitments to developing countries.153 In contrast, the priority of 
ENGOs is to agree on effective commitments for the developed 
world, and only at a second stage do they introduce commit-
147 See id. 
148 Edwin Unsworth, Exposure Heats Up: Climate Change to Raise Claims-
Study, Bus. INs., July 15, 1996, at 17. The report, entitled "Review of the Po-
tential Effects of Climate Change to the U.K.," forecasts a potential six-percent 
increase in mean \vinter wind speeds in southern Britain by 2050. See id. 
149 Christopher Flavin, Storm Warnings, WoRLD WATCH, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 
10, 11. 
150 Insurers Call for Action, supra note 146, at 3 (commenting on the "nota-
ble exception of the U.S."). 
151 See Interview with Frank Nutter, Re-insurance Association of America, in 
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 12, 1997). 
152 See id. 
153 See, e.g., Global Climate Coalition, GCC's Position on tlze Climate Issue 
(visited Feb. 20, 1999) <http://www.globalclimate.org/mission.htm> (ex-pressing 
GCC's support for active participation by developing countries). 
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ments for the developing world.154 BNGOs that have an interest 
in stringent environmental regulations (like the BCSE) also sup-
port a stricter approach regarding developing countries' commit-
ments, even while they agree that Annex I parties should be the 
·first to engage in emissions reduction.tss To explain their posi-
tions publicly, some BNGOs use projected emissions of C02 by 
developing countries. Conservative BNGOs have sometimes 
stressed the issue of American economic well-being. For exam-
ple, after the Kyoto agreement, William O'Keefe, Chairman of 
the GCC, stated that "[ o ]ur folly will bestow enormous economic 
advantages on our international competitors at the expense of 
American business, workers, farmers and consumers. For the 
first time in history, the United States would allow a foreign body 
dominated by developing countries to restrict and control the 
economy of the United States."156 Other BNGOs emphasize dif-
. ferentiated targets and timetables. According to the ICCP, for 
example, the negotiation process should include "commitments, 
possibly differentiated, for developed and developing coun-
tries."157 The e5 stresses the need for "more technology trans-
fer" and that "North-South transfer is essential" to the success of 
any reductions in developing countries.158 Similarly, David Mills, 
Vice-President of the International Solar Energy Society, has 
proposed a plan of action to introduce renewable energy technol-
ogy to developed countries and on a voluntary basis to develop-
ing countries.1S9 
The industry sectors that are likely to suffer the biggest 
share of economic loss are industries that produce or release the 
highest share of C02• Such industries include coal and oil com-
panies, energy companies, transportation, vehicles manufactur-
154 See, e.g., Risky Business: Trading Away Our Responsibilities (visited April 
11, 1999) <http://tamalpais.sierraclub.org/global %2dwarming/riskybusi-
ness.html> (explaining the Sierra Club's preference for preliminary emissions 
reduction in industrialized countries). 
155 See Interview with Kirk Brown, Policy Director, Business Council for Sus· 
tainable Energy, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 1997). 
156 Global Climate Coalition, Industry, Labor Congressional Leaders Express 
Outrage as U.S. Negotiators Fail to Defend U.S. Interests, 5 CLIMATE WATCH 
BRIEF 1, !J[<J[ 6-7 (Dec. 11, 1997) <http://www.globalclimate.org/watch/dec11· 
97.htm>. The article also states that three million jobs could potentially be lost 
in the U.S. if the Kyoto Protocol is ratified. See id. 
157 International Industry Coalition Urges Governments and Industry to Join 
to Create Effective Global Climate Change Process, supra note 127. 
158 Energy: Business Forms Sustainable Energy Council, supra note 144, at 3. 
159 See David Mills, Kick Starting Green Energy, ECO, Apr. 3, 1995, at 3. 
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ers, and energy intensive industries (e.g., producers of heavy 
metals and chemicals). Industry groups that represent these sec-
tors have produced careful studies on the costs of GHG reduc-
tions. The GCC financed a study of the economic consequences 
to industry of a reduction of C02 by twenty percent by 2005 (the 
AOSIS proposal).160 The study concludes that reducing C02 by 
twenty percent by 2010 would reduce the GDP of the United 
States by between 1.5 and 3.5 percent.161 This situation is finan-
cially equivalent to a tax of $200-$300 (in 1990 U.S. dollars) per 
ton of C02 emitted.162 Such an impact would obviously have 
negative consequences for the U.S. economy. In addition to the 
GCC, the American Petroleum Institute and the International 
Chamber of Commerce (along \vith its American affiliate, US-
CIB) emphasize the costs of C02 reductions and suggest that 
more studies should be carried out on both science and econom-
ics before engaging in legally binding commitments.163 
Other BNGOs take different positions on the issue of cost, 
interpreting the results of the IPCC in a more urgent fashion. 
Among the few sectors that have produced cost-benefit analyses 
of the impact of climate change on their business, the most im-
portant one is the insurance and re-insurance industry. Euro-
pean insurance and re-insurance companies are beginning to use 
cost-benefit analysis as an element to explore the possibility of 
their participation in the negotiations. In fact, some European 
members of the industry have recognized that climate change is 
having a major impact on the industry and claim that reducing 
GHG emissions \viii be beneficial to the economy.I64 The e5 also 
shared the view that the costs of reducing C02 \vill eventually be 
less than the costs of climate change itself.16S This position is par-
tially explained by the interests of the companies that are mem-
bers of e5. Most of them are involved in technologies related to 
renewable energies, cogeneration, and natural gas. Thus, they 
would benefit substantially from both a reduction of C02 emis-
160 See WHARTON EcoNOMETRic FoRECASTING Assoc. GROUP & H. 
ZINDER & Assocs., A REvmw oF THE EcoNor.uc lMPACIS OF AOSIS-T"''PE 
PRoPOSALS To LIMIT CARBoN DIOXIDE Er.ussioNs (1996) (study prepared for 
the Global Climate Coalition). 
161 See id. at 26. 
162 See id. 
163 See O'Keefe Address, supra note 44 (arguing that more studies should be 
done before entering legally binding commitments). 
164 See Unsworth, supra note 148, at 17. 
165 See Statement Before AGBM6, supra note 133. 
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sions and the consequent increased use of fewer carbon intensive 
sources of energy. The e5 quoted studies of the International 
Network for Environmental Management and concluded that 
"[o]verall saving energy is several times more labour intensive 
and less capital intensive than providing energy supply .... [It] 
would free up investment for more productive purposes" and 
thus would be beneficial for the economy.166 
Business NGOs have diverse views on the issue of timeta-
bles and targets. Their positions can generally be divided into 
three groups. The first group supports only voluntary actions, 
and does not support any form of fixed target or timetable for 
reduction. GCC's John Schlaes, for instance, thinks that 
"'targets and timetables' is the wrong approach."167 The GCC 
declared that it was "extremely disappointed" that the United 
States would support quantified legally binding objectives,t6s and 
is pushing instead for flexible incentive-based rules.t69 Many in-
dustries prefer flexible timetables and voluntary actions, and 
some have already begun to implement such programs as an ex-
ample of good will.17° Most industry groups fear that fixed 
targets will result in strict policies by national governments that 
will require substantial financial sacrifice and will ultimately re-
sult in economic loss.171 The GCC sponsored a study on the ap-
propriate timing of reductions in GHG emissions that concluded 
that "focusing .on mandatory near-term reductions may not be 
166 Energy: Business Forms Sustainable Energy Council, supra note 144, at 3. 
167 William Miller, Heating Up, INDUS. WEEK, July 1, 1996, at 55, 56. 
168 See Lira Behrens, U.S. Agrees to Legally Binding Targets for Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FED. LANDS, July 22, 1996, at 6, available 
in 1996 WL 8697142. 
169 See Miller, supra note 167, at 56. 
170 Such voluntary programs exist in the U.S., Canada, and Australia. See 
William L. Fang, The U.S. Climate Change Program: Voluntary Government-
Utility Partnerships to Mitigate Greenhouse Emissions (last modified June 4, 
1998) <http://www.ji.org/iuep/ieabonn.shtml> (describing the U.S. program and 
nanring the participating companies). 
171 On this issue, ENGOs conclude that "[w]ithout a legally binding target, 
countries will not only miss the stabilization aim, but will be unable to stabilize 
GHG concentrations at a safe level for humankind and the environment." De-
lia Villagrasa & Jennifer Morgan, Targets Not Aims, ECO, July 17, 1996, at 4, 4. 
Considering how little the developed countries actually achieved in trying to 
implement the non-legally binding agreement reached in Rio, this conclusion 
makes a strong point. See, e.g., Robert Hornung, Voluntary Failures, ECO, July 
12, 1996, at 2 (reporting on the insufficiencies of the Canadian Voluntary Chal-
lenge and Registry Program). 
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cost-effective in light of the specific characteristics of global cli-
mate change."172 
The second group emphasizes the need to get involved in the 
development of the Kyoto Protocol and agrees to support some 
kind of target and timetable. Industry groups such as the ICC, 
the USCIB, and the API have similar positions and stress volun-
tary actionsP3 Recently, there has been a shift by industry to-
wards this position as more evidence of the effects of climate 
change emerges and as industry seeks an economically sensible 
position. 
The third group agrees \vith ENGOs and supports fixed 
timetables and targets. These industry groups generally repre-
sent renewable energy and natural gas companiesP4 Both the 
BCSE and eS support the AOSIS proposal. 
The coal and oil industries especially fear that tight regula-
tions will increase industry costs too much. Irl Engelhart, Chair-
man, President, and Chief Executive of Peabody Holding Co., 
declared that "if global climate change restrictions are imposed, 
the coal industry will not have the opportunity to adjust."175 One 
commentator has suggested that many U.S. industry groups find 
the measures supported by ENGOs, such as "manufacturing-effi-
ciency standards, carbon tax on fuel use and fuel-efficiency stan-
dards for vehicles," to be "anathema" and instead favor 
voluntary agreements like joint implementation.176 The GCC 
proposal, for example, concentrated on improving energy effi-
ciency in developing countries.177 The priorities indicated by the 
WBCSD in implementing the FCCC are cost-effective actions 
172 DAVID HARRisoN, JR. & ALBERT L. NICHOLS, RECENT EVIDENCE ON 
THE APPROPRIATE Tn.nNG OF REoucnoNs IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS at 
E-1 (1996) (study prepared for the Global Climate Coalition by National Eco-
nomic Research Associates (NERA)). 
173 See American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Adions to Address 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (last modified Dec. 18, 1998) <http://www.api.orgl 
globalclimate/page3recommendlink.htm>; The Busuzess Recipe for Combating 
Climate Change, Bus. WoRLD (Dec. 4, 1997) <http://www.iccwbo.org/Busi-
ness_World/1997!The_Busines_recipe_for.htm>. 
174 See Green Plan Boost for U.S. Gas Use, lNT'L GAS REP., Oct 29, 1993, at 
7. 
175 U.S. Coal Chief Concedes Gas Edge, lNT'L GAS REP., May 13, 1994, at 2, 2 
(stating that Peabody Holding Co. controls 10% of U.S. coal production and is 
the largest U.S. coal producer). 
176 Miller, supra note 167, at 56. 
177 See Global Climate Coalition, GCC's Position on the Climate Issue (vis-
ited Feb. 20, 1999) <http://www.globalclimate.orglmission.htm> • 
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(including energy efficiency and joint implementation) and a fo-
cus on the development, implementation, and dissemination of 
new technologiesP8 Similarly, the ICCP supported "market-
based" measures that would ensure that "no individual indus-
tries" are "discriminated against."179 ICCP called for policies 
"that encourage the innovative use of existing technologies that 
can minimize greenhouse gas emissions, and the development of 
even better new technologies."18° The BCSE recommended that 
"policies should be market-based."181 Some industries consider 
joint implementation a cost-efficient way to reduce emissions at 
the globallevel.182 
D. Intra-group Relations Among BNGOs 
The relationship between BNGOs differs from the intra-
group relations of ENGOs in two aspects. First, the discussion 
on climate change is dominated by one section of BNGOs 
(formed mostly by fossil fuels, the energy sector, and chemical 
groups) that has a substantial interest in lobbying the negotia-
tions. The other sectors are active listeners that usually do not 
engage substantially in the negotiations. Second, there is one mi-
nority group that supports views very different from the majority 
of industries, and these views are having a substantial impact on 
the negotiations. This minority is composed of renewable, en-
ergy efficiency, cogeneration, and natural gas companies that 
support near-term targets.ts3 
BNGOs share common positions on some of the elements of 
the FCCC. All BNGOs, for example, support market-based in-
178 See International Business Action in Climate Change Executive Summary 
(visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://194.209.71.99/printpdf/report%20to%20cop2% 
2Djune%2020%20ibacc.doc>. 
179 International Industry Coalition Urges Governments and Industry to Join 
to Create Effective Global Climate Change Process, supra note 127. The ICCP, 
whose majority of members have negotiated the Montreal Protocol on Sub· 
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and have acquired experience on envi-
ronmental treaty negotiations, also stressed the importance that no industry is 
"singled-out." See id. 
180 Id. 
181 John G. Hemphill, Six Principles for a Sustainable Energy Future, CLI-
MATE CHANGE BuLL., 3d Quarter at 7, 7 (recommending the recognition of 
clean energy alternatives). 
182 The WBCSD, ICC, GCC, USCIB, and ICCP all support JI in all FCCC 
parties. The BCSE is the only BNGO that prefers the implementation of JI only 
within Annex 1 parties. See Interview with Kirk Brown, supra note lSS. 
183 See Statement Before AGBM6, supra note 133. 
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struments rather than command-and-control measures.184 Posi-
tions on this and similar issues are also linked to the 
characteristics of industry groups as representative of economic 
actors. 
While some differences existed on the appropriateness of 
measures and timetables, they did not develop into tensions 
among the groups; the majority were united in the negotiations. 
The situation might change for future COPs if other groups be-
come involved more visibly in the negotiations. For example, 
should European insurers decide to lobby for commitments, the 
balance of positions would shift substantially. Environmental 
NGOs claimed that industry was showing signs of increased divi-
sion at AGBM6.185 Business NGO representatives contested this 
claim and commented that industry was not as divided as envi-
ronmental NGOs portrayed them.186 
Some tensions on the substance of the negotiations existed 
only within a defined minority that did not support most of the 
views of other industry groups. Since COP2, this minority has 
produced separated position statements at plenary meetings. 
This is a significant development for the negotiations, but this 
sector is small compared to the majority group. Additionally, the 
minority group has declared that "they agree \vith much of the 
business community on many issues. "187 
E. Inter-group Relations: Existing Collaborations and 
Cooperation Between Environmental and 
Business NGOs 
ENGOs and industry groups are not monoliths. They are 
formed from diverse organizations and express a variety of views. 
Relations among members of industry groups and ENGOs can 
184 A command-and-control (CAC) regulatory approach is based on an envi-
ronmental standard set by the government and enforced by legislation. CAC is 
typically set for siinilar categories of polluting sources. The efficacy of CAC has 
been questioned since it does not differentiate among emissions-reduction costs 
that various polluters encounter and since it imposes the same standards to all 
polluters. The market-based approach used economic instruments, like emis-
sions permits, to reduce emissions. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. 
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, in FoUNDATIONS OF ENVmONMENTAL 
LAw AND PoLICY 133 (Richard L. Revesz ed., 1997). 
185 The dynamic among industry lobbyists was compared to the "last days of 
the Roman Empire." Industry Splits, ECO, Mar. 7, 1997, at 3, 3. 
186 See Statement Before AGBM6, supra note 133. 
187 Id. 
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be characterized in different ways. Because climate change is 
still a political issue, relations are tense, although some coopera-
tion between ENGOs and specific companies or groups is devel-
oping.tss At the COPs, groups mostly lobbied and developed 
their own positions. There was a notable shift in position by in-
dustry to a more environmentally sensitive approach to the cli-
mate problem, especially as the scientific aspects became more 
certain. This shift will probably become more noticeable as the 
discussion moves toward policies to be adopted to implement Ky-
oto reductions. In the past, most of these attempts were initiated 
by ENGOs, with support from some BNGOs. 
This section will first analyze the attempts to increase coop-
eration and dialogue made by research institutes and conflict-res-
olution NGOs. Second, it will examine the efforts of the WWF 
and Greenpeace to involve industrial sectors in the negotiations. 
Some ENGOs and BNGOs do not see the necessity for co-
operation at this stage, while a few are united and cooperate in 
many ways. Some advocacy ENGOs do not want to have contact 
with industry groups, particularly with those representing fossil 
fuel producers.189 These ENGOs think that their positions are so 
far apart that discussion is not possible. Also, some ENGOs con-
sider talking with fossil fuel representatives a compromise that 
they do not want to make. This was especially true for deep ecol-
ogist ENGOs like Greenpeace and Ozone Action.t90 Some EN-
GOs have tried to have discussions in the past, but have failed; 
thus, they feel disillusioned by the prospect of future talks. The 
Sierra Club, for example, participated in discussion groups on 
transportation issues with car manufacturers and concluded that 
there were no issues on which the groups could agree.191 While 
no industry groups have declared that dialogue is useless, some 
ENGOs have openly taken this view.192 Nonetheless, attempts at 
188 For example, "(w]ith EDF, BP will develop a pilot program, setting per-
formance targets in 10 of its operating units, and, within two years, set a volun-
tary company-wide emissions linlit, years ahead of treaty requirements." British 
Petroleum and EDF Efforts Boost Climate Talks, 28 EDF LETTER 1, 'JI1 (Nov. 
1997) <http://W\Vw.edf.org/pubs/EDF-Letter/1997/Novlb_BP.html>. 
189 See Interview with Kelly Sims, supra note 98. 
190 See Interview with Kalee Kreider, supra note 107. 
191 See Interview with Ann Mesnikoff, Associate Representative, Sierra 
Club, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22, 1997). 
192 See Interview with Michael Toman, Senior Fellow and Director, Re· 
sources for the Future, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 11, 1997). 
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dialogue and cooperation have come almost exclusively from the 
ENGO community. 
On the opposite side of the spectrum, some companies are 
so close to ENGOs that members of ENGOs sit on their Boards 
of Directors.193 This is the case for industry groups that repre-
sent renewable energies, cogeneration, energy efficiency, and 
natural gas. In fact, ENGOs also helped form some of these 
groups. The WWI and the EDF, for example, were instrumental 
in the creation of the BCSE.l94 During the negotiations, few at-
tempts were made to reach out to members of the opposite side. 
Business and environmental NGOs did participate together in 
conferences and roundtables on a few occasions, but these osten-
sibly collaborative efforts were generally used by each group to 
reiterate their own positions. More concrete attempts to en-
hance dialogue, cooperation, and relations were addressed by 
some research institutes and conflict resolution NGOs. The EDF 
is an interesting example because its policy statements reflect its 
concerns for environmental goals and economic flexibility. The 
EDF tries to "make people want to walk into the system" of 
GHG restrictions and believes that it should attempt dialogues 
with industry groups.195 Tradable permits and joint implementa-
tion could represent a starting point for dialogue between indus-
try groups and some mainstream ENGOs. There were also 
attempts, exclusively from ENGOs, to involve new BNGOs in 
the COP negotiations. These efforts were directed to sectors that 
were not principal stakeholders at the negotiations and had the 
goal of engaging these sectors in pro-environment lobbying. 
Greenpeace addressed the European insurance and re-insurance 
sectors.196 The WWF approached the building, transportation, 
and heavy industry sectors.197 Ozone Action contacted the tour-
ist industry.198 
Some differences among the business and environmental 
groups are embedded within the characteristics of the groups. 
193 See Interview with Christopher Flavin, supra note 97. 
194 See id.; Interview with Kirk Brown, supra note 155. 
195 Interview with Karan Capoor, supra note 95. 
196 See THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, 
supra note 32, at 83. 
197 See Interview with Peter DeBrine, Program Officer at the Climate Energy 
Program, World Wide Fund for Nature (U.S.), in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 
1997). 
198 See id.; see also Interview with Kelly Sims, supra note 98. 
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ENGOs claim to support moral positions and are therefore con-
sidered to be thinking about the long-term.199 ENGOs also feel 
that they represent both the environment and the public at the 
negotiations.200 On the other side, BNGOs feel they are al-
lowing the economy to grow and are providing wealth essential 
to world· development. These positions are difficult to compro-
mise and should be kept in mind when trying to negotiate. Also, 
some differences are the results of factors that are independent 
from the positions on the negotiations on climate change, such as 
the negotiating position of a national government or variances in 
cultural attitudes. 
The conflict-resolution ENGOs were the most active among 
the environmental groups in trying to find common ground for 
collaboration. Some are characterized by neutrality and belong 
to the project-oriented category (such as the Keystone Center), 
while others try to facilitate dialogue but have a defined position 
on the issue (such as the Center for Clean Air Policy). The Key-
stone Center is a skilled group that has mediated contentious en-
vironmental issues over the years. The Keystone Center 
"enables decision makers from government, the environmental 
community, industry, and citizen organizations to come together 
to clarify issues in disputes" by facilitating mutual understanding 
at the local, national, and international level.201 The Center is 
becoming more involved in the negotiations of the Convention 
and will possibly address the issue of national commitments 
among diverse stakeholders in the future.z02 
The Center for Clean Air Policy was also involved in discus-
sions with energy companies and tried to develop common poli-
cies with them.203 Research institutes, like Resources for the 
Future and the World Resource Institute, took part in studies on 
scientific and economic issues linked to climate change and dis-
seminated their findings to industry groups.204 While it is too 
early to judge the effectiveness of such actions, they are interest-
199 See Interview with Kelly Sims, supra note 98. 
200 Seeid. 
201 THE KEYSTONE CENTER, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1994-1995). 
202 See Interview with Tim Flaherty, Senior Policy Analyst, The Keystone 
Center, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 12, 1997). 
203 See Combating Climate Change Proves Profitable for Cities, NATIONS CIT-
IES WKLY., Sep. 29, 1997, at 13. 
204 See Worldview Climate Change: Most Believe in Warming Threat-Poll, 
GREENWIRE, Aug. 4, 1998, available in WL, ALLNEWSPLUS Database. 
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ing examples of collaboration that may become fruitful. The pro~ 
cess should be monitored closely to follow its development. 
Another kind of relationship among representatives of dif-
ferent groups was developed by three ENGOs: Greenpeace, the 
WWF, and Ozone Action. The three groups contacted repre~ 
sentatives from different industry sectors to explain the dangers 
and possible solutions brought by the Convention. Greenpeace 
addressed the European insurance and re-insurance industries,zos 
which has been receptive to their advice.206 Greenpeace organ-
ized numerous conferences to address the issue \vith the risk sec~ 
tor, published numerous papers, and researched the issue 
extensively.207 European insurance and re-insurance companies 
are not fully involved in the negotiations, but should they decide 
to do so, they will change the equilibrium of industry groups con-
siderably. American insurance companies are not involved in the 
issue, though some attempts have been made to involve them. 
The WWF organized roundtables involving different indus-
try secto:rs to create a critical mass of support for measures to 
curb climate change. The first roundtable took place in Copen~ 
hagen on January 20, 1997. Government officials, e::r."Perts, and 
industry representatives participated. The roundtable concluded 
that there was a "sufficient[ly] firm basis of scientific knowledge 
about climate change to justify policymakers and economic inter-
ests devising strategies and programmes to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases."208 It also concluded that measures to combat 
climate change "could convey economic advantages in view of 
the considerable potential for reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
atJow cost, or at a profit" and offer "advantages to first~mov­
ers."209 Other sectors identified for participation are transporta-
tion and heavy industry (e.g., chemical and energy intensive 
industries ).210 
Similarly, Ozone Action involved the tourist sector in the 
dialogue on climate change. The first meeting \vith members of 
this group was held February 10-14, 1997. The "David and Goli-
205 See Interview with Kalee Kreider, supra note 107. 
206 See Hertsgaard, supra note 129. 
207 See, e.g., LEGGEIT, supra note 130. 
208 Oaude Martin, WWF Round-Table on Climate Change 2 (Jan. 20, 1997) 
(unpublished summary of a roundtable on climate change) (on file with 
author). 
209 Id. 
210 See id. 
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ath campaign" was carried out on the East Coast of the United 
States with the purpose of highlighting "the impacts of global cliM 
mate change on the communities in the United States and to 
make connection between local sea-level rise and the current inM 
temational negotiations on climate change."211 Participants in-
cluded several university professors, two ambassadors of AOSIS 
states, and members of Ozone Action.212 
IV 
METHoDs oF AcnoN 
While their interests differ, environmental and business 
NGOs have used similar methods to influence the outcome of 
climate change negotiations. First, many lobbied and pressured 
governments and international organizations to adopt a position 
in line with their interests.213 Second, NGOs influenced the 
agenda by defining or redefining issues in ways that reflected 
their point of view.214 Third, groups submitted sections or entire 
drafts of conventions to the Conferences of the Parties.zts Both 
environmental and business NGOs predominantly used the first 
and second methods outlined above. The third approach was uti-
lized less extensively at the negotiations, and when it was, it was 
usually used only by ENGOs.zl6 
A. Lobbying 
Environmental and business NGOs were active lobbyists in 
Berlin, Geneva, and Kyoto, just as they previously had been in 
Rio. For example, approximately 1000 representatives of NGOs 
and other private interests groups were accredited as observers at 
Berlin.217 
211 John Passacantando, Summary, in FRoM SEA To SHINING SEA! THE IM· 
PAcrs oF CuMATE CHANGE SEA-LEVEL RisE oN THE EAsT CoAST 2 (Ozone 
Action ed., 1997). 
212 See id. 
213 See infra Part IV.A. 
214 See infra Part IV.B. 
215 See PoRTER & BRoWN, supra note 72, at 50·66 (giving examples of be· 
havior of industry groups and NGOs during other international environmental 
negotiations). 
216 See id. at 54 (arguing that a method solely characteristic of ENGOs is to 
"monitor the implementation of conventions and report to the secretariat and I 
or the parties"). 
217 The exact number of groups admitted as observers to COP! was 165, re· 
suiting in a total of 979 NGO representatiyes. This number is even more im· 
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The groups lobbied in rather distinct ways. ENGOs were 
very outspoken and highly visible. They communicated their po-
sitions through daily publications, innovative forms of protests, 
and criticisms of the positions with which they did not agree. The 
ENGO lobbying effort had two main objectives: to educate the 
public about the dangers of climate change and to persuade gov-
ernment representatives to take decisive action on the issue. 
Climate Action Network, the international network of EN-
GOs, published a daily newspaper, ECO, during the proceedings 
of all three COPs and other intermediate specialized meetings.21s 
They distributed numerous copies of ECO at no charge to the 
representatives. The newspaper summarized the events of the 
day, criticized specific governmental and industry delegations, 
and suggested productive options. In Berlin, for example, ECO 
denounced an informal paper by the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development which indicated a possible 
agreement between the United States and the European Union 
to delay agreements on legal commitments to reduce C02 emis-
sions.219 This secret agreement was contrary to the E.U. official 
position and ministerial mandate. ECO's public denunciation of 
the agreement was central to its failure. In fact, after the publica-
tion of the article, the E.U. returned to its original position.22o 
The newspaper also suggested possible alternatives to fossil 
fuels and new possibilities for developing the Convention.221 As 
ECO had such a wide distribution, it is highly possible that gov-
ernmental representatives read it and adopted some of the view-
points as their own. Moreover, the media that attended the 
events received copies of ECO, and it quickly became a primary 
source of information for press coverage of the COPs. 
pressive when compared with the number of Parties present (117) and the total 
number of Party representatives (757). See Directory of Participants, U.N. 
FCCC, Conference of the Parties, 1st Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/1995/Inf.S/ 
Rev2 (1995). 
218 See generally Hilary F. French, Reforming the United Nations to Ensure 
Environmentally Sustainable Development, 4 TRANSNAT'L L & CONTE..'.tP. 
PRoBs. 559, 598 (1994) (arguing that such newspapers have become "mainstays 
of the international negotiating process"). 
219 See EU Mandate Trashed?, ECO, Mar. 30 1995, at 1. 
220 See Obertiir & Ott, supra note 36, at 145. 
221 See Don't Trade Tech: Transfer for II, ECO, Mar. 29, 1995, at 3 (e:-;plain-
ing the difference between technology transfer and joint implementation); see 
also Two Transportation Options, ECO, Apr. 7, 1995, at 3 (describing car shar-
ing and automobile fuel economy standards as examples of policies to reduce 
C02 emissions). 
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The second way that ENGOs lobbied at the negotiations in-
cluded visible and effective protests both inside and outside the 
conference center. Three activists from Greenpeace, for exam-
ple, climbed a 190-meter tall chimney of a German coal power 
plant in Frimmersdorft (near Cologne) the day before COPl be-
gan and spent twelve days on the chimney.222 Fifty activists 
chained themselves to the coaches and limousines used by dele-
gates to reach the convention center in Berlin to protest the GCC 
and the slow pace of the negotiations at the climate change 
conference.223 
Finally, ENGOs lobbied by identifying specific positions that 
they considered particularly threatening and denouncing them. 
During COPl, for example, ECO published a daily short para-
graph called "Weltshumerz," where the author made fun of ac-
tions by industry groups and government representatives that 
expressed conservative views about the development of the Con-
vention.224 A similar ECO feature was developed during COP2 
under the title "Uman."225 Using a similar technique, Green-
peace published a note on the Internet before the Geneva con-
ference accusing the car industry of lying about the measures 
they planned to implement to protect the environment and com-
paring the public statements of car manufacturers with the reality 
of their behaviors.226 
Business NGOs, on the other hand, kept a low-profile and 
lobbied in more traditional ways. They did not have daily publi-
cations and did not adopt innovative forms of protest. They tried 
to reach and influence government representatives both outside 
and inside negotiations. In addition to publicly stating their 
views, BNGOs also organized conferences and brought scientific 
experts to the negotiations. Business NGOs did not organize 
many events and protests on the outside, but they were very 
present inside the negotiations. They focused on lobbying a few 
222 See Greenpeace Scales Chimney of Coa/fired C02 Factory (Mar. 27, 1995) 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/-climatelberlin1995/index.html#reportl>. 
223 See Ramesh Jaura, Environment: Protests Shake Up the U.N. Climate Meet 
in Berlin, lNrER PRESs SERVICE, Mar. 30, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2260055. 
224 See Weltshumerz, ECO, Mar. 28, 1995, at 4. 
225 See, e.g., Leman, ECO, July 8, 1998, at 4. 
226 See Greenpeace, Rhetoric Versus Reality (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http:// 
www.greenpeace.org/-climate/smile/dirty/6rltetoric.html> (referring to Ford, 
Chrysler, Mercedes-Benz, and Volkswagen). Greenpeace also developed a pro-
totype of a highly efficient car using as a model the model'l\vingo produced by 
Renault. See id. 
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specific representatives with whom they had close relationships. 
For example, the representative of the Climate Council, Dan 
Pearlman, was very friendly with the representatives of oil~pro~ 
ducing countries, Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand.227 Other industry groups, like the GCC, the 
ICCP, and the USCIB, adopted a wider, representative-oriented 
approach. They distributed position papers and research results, 
and organized conferences to present their different views.228 
Business NGOs lobbied governmental representatives before 
meetings and were very active \vithin the various meetings. 
The presence of BNGOs was felt more intensively as the ne~ 
gotiations evolved and the FCCC began to take the shape of a 
legal instrument with teeth. The need of BNGOs to make their 
voices heard throughout the process became clearer. For exam~ 
pie, the ICCP stated that it "recognize[d] that it is industry's re~ 
sponsibility to work with policy makers in understanding the 
changes that are occurring and could occur" and that it "in~ 
tend[ ed] to proactively continue" its participation during the ne~ 
gotiations.229 Even industry groups that represented renewable 
energy, the keenest supporters of mitigation measures, did not 
join ENGOs in their outspoken role. At a maximum, some indus~ 
try groups published articles in EGO describing their activities 
and held policy and technical conferences to present technologi~ 
cal alternatives to coal and oil technology.23o 
Non-government actors also lobbied using the media, both 
through the Internet and through classical mass media sources, 
such as newspapers and television. ENGOs used the new tech~ 
nologies more masterfully than the BNGOs. On the Internet, for 
example, ENGO web pages were better presented and more ac~ 
cessible. Greenpeace is known to have a very specialized and 
modem media center where it can speedily produce high quality 
television reports quickly. Also, many newspapers and special~ 
ized brochures were distributed throughout the negotiations. 
Through the various lobbying methodologies, it is interesting 
to note how the language of non-government actors differed 
12.7 See Interview with Kelly Sims, supra note 98. 
228 At the negotiations BNGOs and ENGOs had two different meeting 
rooms. These rooms were also used to organize conferences where representa-
tives of the two groups were sometimes present. See id. 
229 International Industry Coalition Urges Governments and Industry to Join 
to Create Effective Global Climate Process, supra note 127. 
230 See, e.g., The International Solar Energy Society, ECO, Apr. 3,1996, at 6. 
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from one another. Greenpeace, Ozone Action, and Sierra Club 
used provocative, aggressive, and sometimes moralistic language. 
On the other hand, the EDF, NRDC, WWF, and BNGOs used 
technical and scientific language that was generally less 
aggressive. 
Apart from the official mechanisms set up in the negotia~ 
tions, business and environmental NGOs also lobbied the confer~ 
ences by providing alternative evidence to representatives. Both 
BNGOs and ENGOs financed their own research and substanti~ 
ated their demands with their findings.231 They also reviewed 
and criticized each other's papers.232 Scientific and policy re~ 
search papers were presented at the Conference by the specialists 
who conducted the research, and the scientists were then made 
available for question-and-answer sessions. 
B. Influencing the Agenda 
The second fashion in which business and environmental 
NGOs influenced the FCCC negotiations was by defining or re~ 
defining the issues on the agenda. This activity differed from lob-
bying insofar as it was directed mostly to the definition and re~ 
definition of specific issues rather than general issues of policy~ 
making. 
The principal way in which business and environmental 
NGOs influenced the agenda was by using their official access to 
the Convention to intervene at the negotiations. The Convention 
provided for a limited intervention capacity by non-governmen~ 
tal representatives.233 Each group could present its point of view 
from the floor at the plenary for an allocated amount of time. 
One intervention was usually made by ENGOs and one by 
BNGOs. At COP2 in Geneva, industry made two separate inter~ 
ventions: one represented the point of view of the majority of 
industry groups (like the GCC and ICCP), and the other was 
given by representatives of the renewable energy sector (includ-
ing the USCSE and the e5). After the COPl and COP2 negotia~ 
tions, the GCC claimed particular success in influencing the 
debate, stating that it had been able to bring into the agenda 
231 See, e.g., WHARTON EcoNOMETRIC FoRECASTING Assoc. GRoUP & H. 
ZINDER & Assocs., supra note 160. 
232 See id. (comparing and contrasting existing macroeconomic modeling 
evaluations of the potential impact of emission reduction proposals). 
233 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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items that had previously been neglected by the parties.234 Such 
items included the amount of emissions of developing countries 
in the future and the economic costs of cutting emissions.23s 
C. Presentation of Draft Protocol Provisions 
The third way NGOs influenced the international debate 
was to submit parts or entire drafts of a protocol to the Conven-
tion for consideration by the parties. This method was used dur-
ing the FCCC negotiations in different ways. Under the FCCC, 
NGOs could not propose drafts or parts of drafts directly to the 
Secretariat during negotiations.236 However, industry groups and 
ENGOs could influence the proposals of parties by participating 
in their drafting processes, prior to their submission to the Secre-
tariat. This was relevant at international and national levels. At 
the international level, the most relevant example was that of the 
Foundation for International and Environmental Law (FIELD), 
a British research and advocacy NGO that represented several 
small island states at the negotiation.237 At a national level, the 
U.S. delegation's proposal for a Kyoto Protocol was influenced 
by research and proposals by the EDF, especially with respect to 
the issues of tradable permits and tradable emission systems.23s 
CoNCLUSION 
This study has pointed out that the relationships between 
different NGOs are complex and varied. Relations are not lim-
ited to intra-group interactions, as might have been expected, but 
they include inter-group interactions as well. ENGOs are gener-
ally more interested in contacting BNGOs than vice-versa. Rela-
tionships between the business sector and ENGOs are usually 
left to the initiative of a single company, as the example of the 
collaboration between BP and EDF illustrates. Among different 
ENGOs, more moderate groups try to collaborate with BNGOs 
and specific sectors of the industry. The WWF, for example, ad-
dressed different groups and held conferences to sensitize indus-
234 See Interview with Eric Holdsworth, supra note 114. 
235 See id. 
236 See FCCC, supra note 3, art. 15, 31 I.L.M. at 868 (providing only that 
"Parties" may propose amendments to the Convention). 
237 FIELD is a research institute linked to the School of Oriental and African 
Studies in London. 
238 See Interview \vith Karan Capoor, supra note 95; see also Interview with 
Kelly Sims, supra note 98. 
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try to the problem of climate change, with the goal of finding 
common ground on which to collaborate. A different group of 
ENGOs, which included Greenpeace and Ozone Action, ad-
dressed sectors that are not yet involved in the negotiations, such 
as tourists and insurance industries. Their purpose was to illus-
trate the potential dangers of climate change for the specific 
sectors. 
Intra-group relations are also complex, as NGOs represent 
different world views that negotiate from various perspectives. 
Not all ENGOs supported the same policy measures to reduce 
GHG emissions, and BNGOs defended different approaches to 
the issue of climate change. There was a basic common denomi-
nator, however, that allowed each NGO to function within its 
group. 
Environmental and business NGOs behaved in significantly 
different ways during the negotiations at the COPs. Figure 1 sum-
marizes the different methods adopted by BNGOs and ENGOs 
during the negotiations, according to the analysis presented in 
Part IV. 
FIGURE 1 
METHoDs AND AcnoNs OF ENGOs AND BNGOs AT 
THE NEGOTIATIONS 
ME1HOD A en oN BNGOs ENGOs 
Lobbying Contacts with Yes Yes 
representatives 
Daily publications No Yes 
Protests No Yes 
Use of mass media Yes (but less than Yes 
ENGOs) 
Definition and re- Interventions at Yes Yes 
definition of issues Plenary 
Submission of drafts Directly No No 
Indirectly Yes Yes 
Business NGOs came to lobby particular representatives 
and used classical lobbying methods. ENGOs skillfully utilized 
different media and made their positions very visible. 
This can be explained in different ways. First, environmental 
and business NGOs had different constituencies. ENGOs at-
tempted to educate the public on the effects and threats of cli-
mate change. For BNGOs, lobbying some governmental 
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representatives was just as effective when applied in a soft man-
ner. Although BNGOs needed some support of public opinion, 
ENGOs relied more heavily on public support for their exist-
ence. The use of mass communication to influence public opin-
ion by industry groups was common mostly in the United States. 
Mobil, for example, advertised almost weekly in national news-
papers such as the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal to 
publicize its support for a thorough cost-benefit analysis before 
decisions were made.239 ENGOs rarely used similar newspaper 
campaigns and preferred different media such as the Internet to 
reach what was probably a different kind of audience. 
Second, a substantial part of these differences can be attrib-
uted to the intrinsically different characteristics of the actors. In-
dustry representatives are expected to be more business-like, 
which means that they are not expected to engage in public pro-
tests like chaining themselves to cars. ENGOs, however, are ex-
pected to behave in more creative and progressive ways. 
It is difficult to know how much reconciliation is possible 
among the different views endorsed by the environmental and 
business NG-Gs. Some ENGOs find their roots in moral values, 
and they suggest that they act from a moral point of view. 
BNGOs, on the other hand, feel that they help provide economic 
wealth to the people and that they are responsible to their indi-
vidual shareholders. These differences are important to under-
stand when analyzing the various approaches to climate change 
that business and environmental NGOs confront, address, and 
react to. Also, these differences influence the views of business 
and environmental NGOs on the entire issue of climate change. 
In the future, we can likely expect more dialogue among the 
groups as actions to reduce GHG emissions are taken and the 
negotiations on political issues are overcome. 
239 See, e.g., The Environment: It's Everyone's Business, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
1998, at A27 (explaining in an advertisement by Mobil that emissions need to 
be reduced safely and economically). 
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